Is a two-state solution feasible? (II)

How we got here (part two)

We ended initial entry with the following text:

For there to be any talk of a two-country solution, a precondition is that one of the countries abandons its founding charter and that all those who have intervened step aside. And that would take decades ... if we were lucky enough to be still in 2005.

As we said, an Israeli-Palestinian peace process could have yet been launched in 2005. There was still time. Of course it would have taken decades, but the goal would maybe have been achieved.

However, it is now 20 years since 2005. A lot has happened in that time. And I am not referring (not only, at least) to October 7th.

Let's get a look on history:

• In February 2005 the Knesset approved the plan for unilateral withdrawal from the Strip. In September more than 9.000 Israeli settlers were forcibly evicted. Settlements were partially dismantled. The IDF left Gaza on 1st September 2005.

• Two months later, an agreement (brokered by the US) was signed between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority. The Rafah crossing (controlled by the EU) was reopened linking the Strip with Egypt and the transfer of people and goods was allowed under Israeli control. Israel reserved control of Gaza's air and sea space.

• Everything was in place for the PNA to take power, but in 2006 Hamas won elections with 43% of votes and 74 out of 132 seats. US, EU and Russia asked Hamas to respect the agreements signed with the PNA and recognise Israel's right of exit, but Hamas refused to do so. Later on, Hamas breached the fence, killing two soldiers and kidnapping Gilad Shalit, who would be freed five years later by 1.027 palestinian prisoners.

• Fatah and Hamas formed a concentration government headed by Ismail Haniyeh. However, between Hamas's totalitarian will and Fatah's reluctancy, Fatah (as the ruling party of the PNA) refused to put its forces at the command of the Hamas government, and the war between the two sides began, with bombings, missiles fire and constant clashes. During those months more than 700 palestinians and gazans were killed, and more than 20 executed or directly hanged.

• In June 2007 Hamas expelled Fatah from Gaza, Fatah did the same in the West Bank, a state of emergency was declared and all states (including Egypt) recognised the PNA as the sole ruler of Gaza.

• The clashes led to the enhancement of economic sanctions from PNA and Israel and the closure of border crossings. Above all, Hamas destroyed any assets related to the past, including the airport. They continued to smuggle large quantities of weapons and explosives into the Gaza Strip through tunnels from Egypt and to use these weapons against Fatah and Israel, which in turn responded with pressure via sanctions and bombings, especially since 2008.

• In 2008 the border barrier of the wall dividing the Gaza Strip and Egypt at the town of Rafah was demolished, hundreds of thousands of gazans crossed the border and entered Egypt. Egypt closed the border and Israel resumed its attacks on Jabaliya after the firing of Qassam rockets. On 25th November 2008, Israel also closed its borders to the passage of goods.

• During 2009 the fighting continued in a situation very similar to that of 2024, Hamas launching rockets from civilian areas and Israel responding with bombings.

So much for the first three years of the Hamas government's ‘life’.

What lessons can we learn from this part of the story?

• The first, and most relevant, is to turn to the “whys” or in other words, to the first principles or ultimate cause. Because in the heat of information and clashes, it is often forgotten what is the trigger from which the conflict is born.

• What is the cause? That when Israel withdraws from the Strip, the population, even from the ineffectiveness and corruption of the PNA, opts for Hamas's jihadism, whose founding charter includes the destruction of Israel.

• This situation (voting for “illuminati” fundamentalists or terrorists) because of the incompetence and corruption of the previous rulers, is something we have seen many times in the Arab world (as I said in the first post) and which has many points of contact with the world in 2025.

In other words: the mediate cause is the PNA's corruption, but the efficient cause is Hamas. It is always Hamas. Ready to burst any possibility of a peaceful settlement with the PNA, Fatah, Israel or Egypt. They only admit jihadism and the death of the adversary. Of all.

For this reason (yet another) the two-state solution is unfeasible. Because it is impossible when one of them is confronting all the others with terrorist activities. No one can have as a neighbour those who only think of destroying him.

Later came the Liberty Ships (2010) Pillar of Defense (2012) Protective Edge (2014) the March of Return and others, always with a similar pattern. That will be the content of a third and final entry of this series.

(to be continued)

---